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* This article draws inspiration from (and develops the considerations carried out in) our essay Il Tribunale 
costituzionale portoghese, i risvolti sociali delle misure di austerità e il rispetto dei vincoli internazionali ed europei, in 
Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale, vol. 7, n. 2, 2013, 465-480. Roberto Cisotta has drafted paras 1-3, while Daniele 
Gallo has drafted par. 4. ""°Adjunct Professor, LUMSA University, Rome; Ph.D., University of Trieste (2006-2009); former Legal Secretary, 
General Court of the EU. """+Qualified as Associate Professor of International Law and EU Law (since December 2013/January 2014). Currently 
Assistant Professor in EU Law, Luiss University (Rome) (since 2011); Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Global 
Governance Studies, Leuven University (Leuven) (2014); European Union Fulbright Schuman Scholar, Fordham Law 
School (New York) (2010); DAAD Scholar, Max Planck Institute for Public Comparative Law and International Law 
(Heidelberg) (2009-2010); Jean Monnet Fellow, European University Institute (Florence) (2008-2009); Ph.D. in 
International and EU Law, Sapienza University (Rome) (2004-2008). 
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1 For a presentation, see the two papers by Júlio Gomes and Miguel Nogueira de Brito, forthcoming in de Witte, 
Kilpatrick, 2014. 
2 Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, 18 May 2011, which incorporates the 
precedent Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP), 
www.ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/mou/2011-05-18-mou-portugal_en.pdf. The Portuguese crisis has to 
be understood in the more general framework of the responses provided by the EU and its Member States to the 
sovereign debt crisis: see A. VITERBO and R. CISOTTA, ‘La crisi del debito sovrano e gli interventi dell’UE: dai primi 
strumenti finanziari al Fiscal compact’, Il diritto dell’Unione europea, 2012, p. 323 ss., especially p. 329. For an 
analysis from the economic point of view of the deterioration of Portugal’s financial situation, see: D. GROS, “Greece 
and Portugal: Similar Fundamentals but Different Outcomes?”, CEPS Commentary, 17 February 2011, 
www.ceps.eu/book/greece-and-portugal-similar-fundamentals-different-outcomes; European Commission, ‘The 
Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal’, Occasional Paper 79, June 2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp79_en.pdf, especially pp. 5-13; F. 
CARBALLO-CRUZ, ‘La crisis económica y financiera en Portugal: orígenes, ajuste y situación un año después’, Revista 
de Estudios Europeos 2012, pp. 9-31. 
3 Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism OJ 
L 118, 12.5.2010, p. 1–4. 
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4 The EFSF has been created by the Euro Area Member States aa a société anonyme incorporated in Luxembourg and it 
can provide financial aid to Euro Area Member States. On the features of the EFSM and of the EFSF and on their birth 
in the aftermath of the Geek crisis, see A. VITERBO, R. CISOTTA, ‘La crisi della Grecia, l’attacco speculativo all’euro e 
le risposte dell’Unione europea’, Il Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2010, p. 961 ss., especially pp. 980-988. Afterwards, 
the EFSF has been replaced by a permanent mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM): see the Treaty 
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582311/05-
tesm2.en12.pdf. The possibility to establish such a mechanism has been explicitly stated at primary law level thanks to 
an amendment to Article 136 TFEU: see European Council Decision No 2011/199/EU of 25 March 2011 amending 
Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member 
States whose currency is the euro, OJ L 91, 6.4.2011, p. 1–2. 
The Court of Justice has recently confirmed the validity of this decision in its judgment in case C-370/12, Pringle 
[2012], nyr. The judgment is quite complex and it addresses the compatibility of the whole legal solution with EU law. 
See B. DE WITTE and T. BEUKERS, ‘The Court of Justice approves the creation of the European Stability Mechanism 
outside the EU legal order: Pringle’, Common Market Law Review 2013, p. 805 ff.; P. Craig, ‘"Pringle": legal 
reasoning, text, purpose and teleology’, Maastricht journal of European and comparative law, 1/2013, p. 3 ff.; D. 
Thym and M. Wendel, ‘Préserver le respect du droit dans la crise; la Cour de justice, le MES et le mythe du déclin de 
la Communauté de droit (arrêt Pringle)’, Cahiers de droit européen, 3/2012, p. 733 ff. 
5 Such Facility has been constituted in 1974 to provide aid to Countries experiencing difficulties in their balance of 
payments. 
6 On MEPF and MoU see fn 2-4. All the documents on which the PAEF is based are attached to ‘The Economic 
Adjustment Programme for Portugal’, Occasional Paper 79, cit., p. 37 ff. A separate letter of intent has been addressed 
to the Managing Director of the IMF: see infra, fn 12. 
7 Council Implementing Decision No 2011/344/EU of 30 May 2011 on granting Union financial assistance to Portugal, 
OJ L 159, 17.6.2011, p. 88–92, as amended by the following Council implementing decisions: 2012/224/EU, of 29 
March 2012, OJ L 115 27.4.2012; 2012/409/EU of 10 July 2012, OJ L 192 20.7.2012; 2012/658/EU of 9 October 2012, 
OJ L 295 del 25.10.2012; 2013/64/EU of 20 December 2012, OJ L 26 26.1.2013; 2013/323/EU of 21 June 2013, OJ L 
175, 27.6.2013; 2013/703/EU of 19 November 2013, OJ L 322, 3.12.2013. In recital (6) of this decision, it is recalled 
that the financial assistance is provided within the framework of the PAEF. 
One may wonder whether the implementing decision is aimed at implementing one of the international instruments (of 
the PAEF) within the EU legal order, or Regulation 407/2010, cit. establishing the EFSM. In this context, it seems more 
natural to prefer the first alternative, as the EU has committed itself – although not being formally part of the relevant 
international instruments – to granting a part of the loan and there should be an act implementing this obligation within 
the EU legal order. Nonetheless, even the other alternative would not undermine the fact that, as it will be argued in the 
text, Portugal has essentially undertaken international obligations and that formally speaking EU law is merely playing 
an ancillary role. 
8 By the Loan Facility Agreement, signed on 27 May 2011, the loan has been effectively granted; see now the Master 
Financial Assistance Facility Agreement of 24-25 May 2012, www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/efsf_portugal_ffa.pdf. 
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9 In principle, the Commission and the ECB, as Institutions of the EU, should act on his behalf and the Union, not its 
Institutions, is endowed with international legal personality (see for instance: A. TIZZANO, ‘La personalità giuridica 
dell’Unione europea’, Il Trattato di Amsterdam, Milano, 1999, p.  123 ff., espec. p. 149; other authors do not share this 
view and affirm the ECB is an autonomous legal person under international law: see C. ZILIOLI, M. SEMAYR, ‘The 
External Relations of the Euro Area: legal aspects’, Common Market Law Review 1999, p. 273 ff. espec. p. 282). In this 
context, one may wonder whether the two EU Institutions, because in particular of the involvement of the EFSM – an 
EU instrument, as we have seen – are effectively acting as arms of the Union. Nevertheless, despite the decision 
regarding the involvement of the EFSM has to be clearly adopted within the EU legal framework and according to its 
relevant rules, it seems more appropriate to affirm that it is not the EU that is acting within the Trojka (through its 
Institutions and alongside the IMF), but the Member States of the Euro Area, so the Commission and the ECB are 
actually acting on their behalf (or on behalf of the EFSF and, in the future, they will act on behalf of the ESM: both 
mechanisms can be considered independent legal subjects, however it has to be recalled that they have been established 
by those States and the EU once more is not formally involved). In fact, the EU has not directly concluded with 
Portugal any of the relevant instruments: the procedures existing under EU law to conclude international agreements 
have not been used and formal obstacles do exist in EU law that could not be overcome (see infra, fn 13). The only 
foothold of the EU is the EFSM, which is not a legal subject under international law and therefore cannot per se 
subscribe any of those instruments. It has been (apart the IMF) the EFSF, which has directly entered into formal 
agreements with Portugal: see in particular Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement, cit. 
What is relevant for the EU legal order here is that the Commission, in line with its general tasks, as enshrined in 
Article 17 TEU, should grant the compatibility of the instruments which are negotiated and adopted in this context with 
EU law (this has been affirmed by the Court of Justice with reference to the activity of the ESM and should be 
considered true, mutatis mutandis, for the EFSF: see Pringle, cit., paras 160-165, espec. 164). 
10 Such links could not lead to attract the instruments in question to the EU legal order, since the obstacle of their 
international legal nature cannot be overcome. This has been the choice of the Euro Area Member States and this 
circumstance cannot be called into question. 
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11 For an analysis of this problem in the Portuguese literature, see: E. Correia Baptista, ‘Natureza jurídica dos 
memorandos com o FMI e com a União Europeia, Revista da Ordem dos Advogados, 2011, p. 477 ff. 
12 In particular, the MoU is attached to the mentioned letter of intent and to the other one addressed to the Managing 
Director of the IMF. See supra, fn 2-4 and 6. The letter of intent sent to the Managing Director of the IMF and the 
annexed documents are published on the website of the IMF: https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2011/prt/051711.pdf. 
The form (and formal presentation) of the MoU, and of the whole PAEF, simply makes amendments easier. To date 
there have been nine updates. 
13 This escape from EU law is due to the lack under that legal order of instruments suitable to provide assistance to 
Member States whose currency is the Euro experiencing financial troubles. This is due to two factors. First, there is an 
explicit prohibition, enshrined in Article 125 TFEU (no bail-out clause) for the Union and for Member States to assume 
(and it cannot be liable for) the financial commitments of (another) Member State. This rule is rigidly applied only to 
Member States whose currency is the Euro with a view to preserving the financial stability of the Euro Area: in fact the 
TFEU itself (Article 143) does provide the possibility of provide financial aid to Member States with a derogation (i.e. 
whose currency is not the Euro). Nonetheless, after the first rescue package provided to Greece in May 2012, Article 
125 has been (re-)interpreted, also on the basis of solid textual arguments, as non-absolute prohibition limited only to 
direct commitments. Second, the Union enjoys only weak competences in the field of ‘economic policy’(Chapter 1, 
Title VIII of the Third Part of the TFEU), while it has an exclusive competence as regards monetary policy for Member 
States whose currency is the Euro (Article 3(1) (c) TFEU). As it results from Article 2, TFEU, such competences in 
economic policy only allow a coordination of national policies at the EU level and cannot be classified within anyone of 
the canonical forms of competences (exclusive, shared or competences to support, coordinate or supplement Member 
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States’ actions): see M. DOUGAN, The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts, in Common Market Law 
Review, 3/2008, p. 617 ss., espec. pp. 655-6. Furthermore, according to Article 5(1) TFEU (which, like Articles 2 and 3, 
just mentioned, is inserted in Title I of the First Part of the TFUE, whose title is: ‘Categories and Areas of Union 
Competences’), ‘[s]pecific provisions shall apply to those Member States whose currency is the euro’: many of the 
innovations introduced in the context of the sovereign debt crisis can be probably associated to the ‘specificities’ of the 
situation of Member States of the Euro Area. On these issues, and on the problems emerging from the setting up of a 
mechanism like the EFSM, see: A. VITERBO, R. CISOTTA, ‘La crisi della Grecia, l’attacco speculativo all’euro e le 
risposte dell’Unione europea’, cit., espec. pp. 964-974. The Court of Justice of the EU has dealt with the interpretation 
of Article 125 TFEU in the Pringle case, cit. (see paras 64, 108-114, 130-137) (see supra, fn 4) and it has in substance 
endorsed the restrictive interpretation of the prohibition laid down in Article 125 TFEU, just recalled, on which the EU 
Institutions and Member States (in particular those of the Euro Area) have relied upon in the context of the crisis. This 
judgment regards (indirectly) the institution of the ESM (which, according to a widespread opinion, can be regarded as 
the financial stability mechanism for Euro Area Member States which lacked in the original design of the founding 
Treaties): the weakness of the competences of the EU in the economic policy field has lead the Court, amongst other 
arguments, to derive from the system of the Treaties the existence of a competence of the Member States of the Euro 
Area to establish a system like the ESM. 
14 On the absence of any reference to ‘counter-limits’ and to Article 8.4 of the Portuguese Constitution, see infra, par. 4. 
15 See order in case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte et al. v. BPN – Banco Português de Negócios SA 
[2013], nyr (see in particular paras 10-12). The referring court raised some doubts as to the conformity of the budget 
law with the principles on human rights protection under EU law and the Charter; however, according to Article 51, par. 
1 of the Charter itself, it has to be respected by Member States only when applying EU law (the same is true for 
principles on human rights protection). Moreover, the Court stresses that, according to Article 6 TEU, the Charter has 
the same legal value as the Treaties, but it does not create new competences for the Union: by recalling this statement, 
the Court seems to stress once more that the EU does not enjoy any kind of competences in this area. Even if this was 
the real underlying intention of the Luxembourg judges, it is not clear whether it has been the referring court to fail to 
provide evidence of application of EU law (thus giving the European judges a chance to give up), or it has been the 
Court of Justice that has not attached importance to the involvement of the EFSM (therefore to Regulation 407/2010, 
cit. and to the Council implementing decision No 2011/344, cit.). It seems nevertheless quite clear that the Court of 
Justice is willing to preserve the essentially international nature of the rescue package, probably at the same time 
keeping the EU legal order not involved in the delicate issue of the contrast between austerity measures and 
fundamental rights. However, the question arises as to whether the application of the Charter of fundamental rights of 
the EU can be (so easily?) avoided, given that it cannot be denied that pieces of EU law are applied in this context (even 
if, as explained in the text, such pieces of EU law play only an ancillary role in the context of the provision of financial 
aid to Portugal). 
The Court might have the chance to better explain its views in some pending cases: case C-264/12, Sindicato Nacional 
dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins v. Fidelidade Mundial - Companhia de Seguros, SA (once more from the Tribunal 
do trabalho do Porto, concerning this time budget law 2012); Case C-566/13, Jorge Ítalo Assis dos Santos v. Banco de 
Portugal; case C-665/13, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins (from the Tribunal do Trabalho de 
Lisboa). 
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.L2&9*):'7"*0(*79.').,)=!'I*!,0K&3K(-!*7(!9&)(!:(0().3!.??)&.87!&6!*7(!J),'I0.3V!,*!)(:.)1-!*7(!,0*)I-,&0! ,0! .0! .33(:(13$! (Z83I-,K(! 8&9?(*(08(! &6! *7(! 0.*,&0.3! 3(:,-3.*&);! F-! *7(! 3(:,-3.*&)!-7&I31! '(! :).0*(1! .! ?.)*,8I3.)3$!L,1(!9.):,0! &6! 1,-8)(*,&0! ,0! (8&0&9,8! ?&3,8$! 87&,8(-=! *7,-!.??)&.87!L&I31!'(!,0.19,--,'3(!&'3#")*#"*!.-!)(:.)1-!'I1:(*!3.L-;!O&)(&K()=!&0(!9.$!L&01()!L7(*7()=!.-!*7(!8&0-,1()(1!'I1:(*!3.L-!,9?3(9(0*(1!,0*()0.*,&0.3!&'3,:.*,&0-=!*7(!9.):,0!&6!
                                                            
16 See G. Coelho, P. Caro de Sousa, «La morte dei mille tagli». Nota sulla decisione della Corte costituzionale 
portoghese in merito alla legittimità del bilancio annuale 2013, Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni industriali, 
3/2013, 527 – 544. The two authors make reference in particular to judgment No. 187/2013. 
17 The greater the difference between the two groups, the wider the discretion enjoyed by the public authorities in 
establishing differentiated treatments: this is the way the Tribunal itself interprets the comparison. However, according 
to the reported authors, the lack of sufficient legal justification for considering the two group comparable – and the 
omission of important circumstances, like the different benefits and guarantees in case of unemployment, as well as the 
differences in treatment between the two groups envisaged by the Portuguese Constitution itself – constitutes the first 
flaw of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal. 
18 Ibid., 540 ff. For similar criticisms see also infra, fn 33, 34 and corresponding text. 
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19 On the topic see supra, par. 2. 
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20 See judgments 72/2002, of 20 February 2002 and 3/2010, of 6 January 2010. 
21 According to the Tribunal, “[è] ao legislador que incumbe fazer as necessárias ponderações que garantam a 
sustentabilidade do sistema e a justiça na afetação de recursos” (judgment 187/2013, para. 57, p. 2376); see also para. 
58, p. 2377 of judgment 187/2013. 
22 On this point, see the still-relevant observations by M. S. GIANNINI, Stato Sociale: una nozione inutile, in Aspetti e 
tendenze del diritto costituzionale. Scritti in onore di C. Mortati, vol. I, Milano, 1977, p. 141 ff.; see also R. PLANT, 
Modern Political Thought, London, 1991, p. 269, according to whom “[p]ositive rights, as rights to resources, are 
always claimed against a background of scarcity and therefore there are limitations on satisfying them” and S. HOLMES, 
C. R. SUNSTEIN, The Cost of Rights. Why Liberty depends on Taxes, New York-London, 1999. From a different 
perspective, on the similarities between social rights and civil/political rights see M. LUCIANI, Sui diritti sociali, in 
Democrazia e diritto, 1995, p. 545 ff. 
23 See judgment 187/2013, para. 57, p. 2376. 
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L7$!*7(!J),'I0.3!6&I01!.!K,&3.*,&0!&6!*7(!+&0-*,*I*,&0!1&(-!0&*!3,(!,0!*7(!6.8*!*7.*!.!)(1I8*,&0!&6!*7(!?(0-,&0!L&I31!'(!7."',.!,0!8&063,8*!L,*7!*7(!),:7*!*&!-&8,.3!-(8I),*$!I01()!F)*;!b`!+&0-*;=!-,08(! *7(! J),'I0.3! L.-! 0&*! (0*,*3(1! *&! .! 1(83.).*,&0! *&! *7.*! (66(8*;! %.*7()=! *7(!I08&0-*,*I*,&0.3,*$!&6!F)*;!cc!&6!]_NABC`!3,(-!,0!*7(!6.8*!*7.*!*7(!9(.-I)(!*7()(,0!?)&K,1(1!6&)!,-!9(.0*!*&!.??3$!*&!.!L,1(=!I01,66()(0*,.*(1![.I1,(08(W!&6!8,*,Y(0-a!,0!*7,-!-(0-(=!,*!)(-I3*-!6)&9!*7(! .??3,8.*,&0! &6! *7(! ?),08,?3(! &6! (RI.3,*$AD=! ,0! *7(! 6,(31! &6! 6,-8.3! ?&3,8$=! *7.*! ,-=! *7(!p-I'?),08s?,&!1(0-,6,8.1&)uAd!&6!.!?)&:)(--,K(!,08&9(!*.Z!-$-*(9Abc! 7.-!'((0! )(.66,)9(1=! ).*7()! *7.0! '$! ,*-! 0.*I).3! .:(0*=! '$! *7(! J),'I0.3Agh;!_0(!&6!*7(!,--I(-!*7.*!L,33!7.K(!*&!'(!.--(--(1!,0!*7(!6I*I)(!,-!*&!L7.*!(Z*(0*!*7(!H&)*I:I(-(!SI),-?)I1(08(!9.$!
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
24 See judgment 187/2013, paras 54 and 59, p. 2375 and p. 2377. 
25 This expression, in the plural, has been employed by the Tribunal to clarify that the principle of equality is a sub-
principle, like others, of the principle of “Estado de direito democrático” recognized in Art. 2 Const.; see para. 54 of 
judgment 187/2103, para. 54, p. 2375. 
26 See judgment 187/2013, para. 54, p. 2375. 
27 On the notion of “social sovereignty” see R. LATHAM, Social Sovereignty, Theory, Culture and Society, 2000, p. 1 ff.; 
see also M. FERRERA, The Boundaries of Welfare. European Integration and the Spatial Politics of Social Protection, 
Oxford 2005 and S. SCIARRA, L’Europa e il lavoro – Solidarietà e conflitto in tempi di crisi, Roma-Bari, 2013. 
28 On the relationship between constitutional courts and politics see G. ZAGREBELSKY, Principî e voti. La Corte 
costituzionale e la politica, Torino, 2005. 
29 On the concepts of legal pluralism as well as on the constitutionalisation of international law and internationalisation 
of constitutional law see, inter alia, G. DE BÚRCA, O. GERSTENBERG, The Denationalization of Constitutional Law, 
Harvard International Law Journal, 2006, p. 243 ff.; N. WALKER, Beyond boundary disputes and basic grids: Mapping 
the global disorder of normative disorders, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2008, p. 373 ff.; A. VON 
BOGDANDY, Pluralism, direct effect, and the ultimate say: On the relationship between international and domestic 
constitutional law, ivi, p. 397 ff.; M. POIARES MADURO, Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial 
Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism, J. L. DUNOFF, J. P. TRACHTMAN (eds.), Ruling the 
World? Constitutionalism, International law, and Global Governance, Cambridge, 2009, p. 356 ff.; A. NOLLKAEMPER, 
National Courts and the International Rule of Law, Oxford, 2010; C. FOCARELLI, International law as Social Construct. 
The Struggle for Global Justice, Oxford, 2012, ff. 316-349; D. TEGA, I diritti in crisi. Tra Corti nazionali e Corte 
europea di Strasburgo, Milano, 2012, ff 23-44. 
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30 On rules and principles see, among others, R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously, London, 1978, Ch. 2.  
31 The fact that the main sedes materiae is international law rather than EU law entails that the EU Charter of 
fundamental rights is not applicable; on this point see F. COSTAMAGNA, Saving Europe Under Strict Conditionality’: A 
Threat for EU Social Dimension?, Working Paper-LPF, 2012, n. 7. 
32 In these terms J. KLABBERS, A. PETERS, G. ULFSTEIN, The constitutionalization of international law, Oxford, 2009, p. 
127. 
33 Contra, with regard to the PCT jurisprudence see G. DE ALMEIDA RIBEIRO, Judicial Activism Against Austerity in 
Portugal, International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, Dec. 3, 2013, available at:  
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/12/judicial-activism-against-austerity-in-portugal/ who, in his harsh criticism of the 
PCT’s approach, refers to the risk that democracy would give way to “juristocracy”. 
34 On the risks deriving from such ‘creativity’ see M. CAPPELLETTI, Giudici legislatori?, Milano, 1984 and J. 
WALDRON, The Core of the Case against Judicial Review, Yale Law Journal, 2006, p. 1346 ff. On judicial activism and 
originalism see J. RUBENFELD, Freedom and time – a theory of constitutional self-government, 2001, p. 188. 
